We study the impact of history curricula on national identity in Taiwan. The high school curriculum reform of September 2006 separates the history of Taiwan from Chinese chronology and increases Taiwan-oriented content to transmit Taiwanese identity. We document an unintended "backlash" that individuals studying the new curriculum are more likely to hold both greater Taiwanese and Chinese identities. Our analysis suggests endogenous changes in information demand as a prominent mechanism: treated high schoolers show greater identity awareness and acquire more information related to both identities. We further observe consistent attitudinal changes, with milder political views and an increase in votes for median candidates or abstention.

Subjective beliefs – many of which are non-factual or false – influence human decision-making, potentially including key individuals that wield considerable power. This paper documents for the first time the macro-level impact of politicians’ non-factual beliefs, exploiting prominent Chinese traditional beliefs that allow us to link quasi-random, leader-specific spatial biases to regional development within cities. We find that municipal zones perceived as unfavorable to mayors have an average 2 percent lower GDP compared to other zones. Exploiting mayoral reports and administrative micro-level data, we show reduced policy support and public investment as the key drivers. Downstream changes in firms and house holds further amplify the loss, with a 6% decrease in firm entry, a 4% reduction in the productivity of remaining firms, and a small population decline. Our back-of-the envelope calculation suggests such non-factual beliefs of Chinese mayors are associated with at least a 0.1% annual GDP loss over the past two decades. Overall, our findings highlight subjective beliefs as an important determinant of leader performance that matters for economic development. 

I study the impact of corruption crackdown on human capital supply for the state, exploiting China's staggered anti-corruption inspections. Using unique applicant data from state organizations, I find that anti-corruption induces positive selection for integrity and prosociality into the state sector, without significantly affecting overall ability. These shifts in supply are associated with enhanced work performance. Changes in occupational preferences corroborate static talent allocation as a salient mechanism, in which treated honest types show higher preferences for state jobs -- even when conditioned on ability and family background. I further document dynamic effects wherein households increase investment in human capital and the integrity of the next generation. Together, these findings highlight reward structures as an important determinant of the state sector's human capacity. 

Presentations/Awards: Stanford DevPEC (2022), NEUDC (2022), ASSA (2023); Rosenstein-Rodan Prize  (2024)

We study favoritism in the selection of elite scientific talent, by examining the relationship between host institution affiliation and performance in the Chinese Science Olympiad, where a gold medal guarantees a student's admission to top universities. Using hand-collected participant-level data (2003 - 2021), we find that host-affiliated students have a significantly higher winning probability, and the effect is more pronounced in host provinces where corruption norms are more prevalent. We present evidence suggestive of cheating behavior using a portion of the contest vulnerable to information leakage, as well as the centralized post-Olympiad selection outside the control of host provinces. Together, our findings shed light on the crucial role of organizational structure in designing equitable assessment systems for talent. 

Many societies hold traditional culture tied to psychological factors that are socioeconomically relevant.  This paper shows its substantial impact on public leadership and governance, leveraging widely-held "zodiac year" beliefs about risk-avoidance in rural China, which follow an exogenous 12-year cycle tied to a person's birth year. Using a representative village panel, I find that village heads in their zodiac years improve governance processes and enhance villagers' perception about responsiveness. I also observe consistent expenditure changes, with higher public good spending and a comparable decline in administration spending that is prone to misuse. However, treated leaders are also less likely to promote policy innovation. These results can be most easily reconciled with a shift in village heads' risk-taking, which can yield a potential trade-off between accountability and public entrepreneurship.

We study the impact of China’s Southbound Bureaucrat Program (1948-1950), the world’s largest state workforce migration — which sent around 100,000 front-line bureaucrats to newly liberated South China. Digitizing historical records, we characterize positive selection on bureaucrats’ socialist ideology. We find southbound bureaucrats foster a more pro-socialist development trajectory over half a century. In the short run, they better promote communist policies. In the longer run, more affected regions have lower inequality and greater welfare provision, likely attributed to stronger state interventionism and human capacity. Further analysis suggests bureaucrats’ socialist ideology plays a pivotal role. Their influence persists via local personnel and cultural spillovers. Collectively, our findings highlight  that bureaucrats can substantially shape short and longer-run development trajectories. 

Funding: BU GDP Field Fellowship, Manual A. Abdala Fund, RUC Scientific Research Fund