Justin J. Hong

Welcome! I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at Boston University. 

I will be on the job market in AY 2024-2025.

Fields of Interest: Development Economics, Political Economy, Labor Economics

Contact Information:  

Email: hjihao@bu.edu

Mailing: Department of Economics, Boston University, 

270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USA



Working Papers

Leader Biases and Economic Development: Evidence from Superstitious Chinese Mayors (with Y. Zhao)

Presentations: CES (2024), AMES (2024), IAAE (2024), CEPR (2024), ASSA/NAWM-ES (2025)

Corruption and Human Capital Supply for the State  

[R&R at  Journal of Labor Economics]

Presentations/Awards: Stanford DevPEC (2022), NEUDC (2022), ASSA Annual Meeting (2023); Rosenstein-Rodan Prize  (2024)

I study the impact of corruption crackdown on human capital supply for the state, exploiting China's staggered anti-corruption inspections. Using unique applicant data from state organizations, I find that anti-corruption induces positive selection for integrity and prosociality into the state sector, without significantly affecting overall ability. These shifts in supply are associated with enhanced work performance. Changes in occupational preferences corroborate static talent allocation as a salient mechanism, in which treated honest types show higher preferences for state jobs -- even when conditioned on ability and family background. I further document dynamic effects wherein households increase investment in human capital and the integrity of the next generation. Together, these findings highlight reward structures as an important determinant of the state's human capacity. 

Risk-Taking and Public Leadership: Evidence from Chinese Villages  [Submitted]

Host Favoritism and Talent Selection in Chinese Science Olympiads (with X. Li) 

[Draft: 2024] [R&R at  Journal of Law, Economics & Organization]

We study favoritism in the selection of elite scientific talent, by examining the relationship between host institution affiliation and performance in the Chinese Science Olympiad, where a gold medal guarantees a student's admission to top universities. Using hand-collected participant-level data (2003 - 2021), we find that host-affiliated students have a significantly higher winning probability, and the effect is more pronounced in host provinces where corruption norms are more prevalent. We present evidence suggestive of cheating behavior using a portion of the contest vulnerable to information leakage, as well as the centralized post-Olympiad selection outside the control of host provinces. Together, our findings shed light on the crucial role of the organizational structure in designing equitable assessment systems for talent. 

Not Always a Panacea: History Education and Identity-Building in Taiwan (with Y. Lyu) 

[*Pre-PhD research: Draft] [R&R at  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization]

Using novel data from Taiwan, we examine the impact of history curricula on national identity. The regular-track high school curriculum reform of September 2006 separates the history of Taiwan from Chinese chronology and sharply increases Taiwan-oriented content to transmit Taiwanese identity. We document an unintended ``backlash'' that individuals studying under the new curriculum are more likely to report both greater Taiwanese and Chinese identities. We show endogenous changes in information demand as a prominent mechanism: treated high schoolers exhibit greater identity awareness and acquire more information related to both cultural identities, which in turn increases dual-identity recognition. We further observe consistent attitudinal changes, with milder political axes and an increased likelihood of voting for median candidates and abstention.

Work in Progress